Major General Lloyd Fredendall

Major General Fredendall Visits Atterbury
Camp Crier, April 16, 1943

On his first inspection tour of the 83rd Infantry Division last week-end, Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall (left), new Deputy Commander of the 2nd Army, saw a demonstration of Ranger training.  Here with Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn, commanding geneal of the 83rd Division, he is listening to an explanation of demolition by 1st Lt. Frank Couture, Co. A, 308th Engineers.

General Fredendall Inspects 83rd For First Time.
New 2nd Army Deputy Commander Sees Rangers

Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, new deputy commander of the 2nd Army, spent Sunday and Monday at Camp Atterbury inspecting the 83rd Infantry Division for the first time.

Hero of the American landing at Oran, Gen. Fredendall recently returned from Tunisia.  He brings to his new assignment some 42 years of Army service.

While at Atterbury, Gen. Fredendall inspected all phases of the training of troops under the command of Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn, commanding general of the 83rd Division.  Highlight of his visit was a demonstration of Ranger training, a project close to the heart of Lt. Gen. Ben Lear, retiring commanding general of the 2nd Army, whose desire is to have every man in the 2nd Army a Ranger.

The visit of Gen. Fredendall had a personal note, too, for his son, Maj. Lloyd R. Fredendall, Jr., is commander of the 1st battalion of the 330th Infantry.

Fredendall, Lieutenant-General Lloyd R. (1883-1963):
41     : General Officer Commanding II Corps
42     : General Officer Commanding Central Task Force, North Africa
42     : General Officer Commanding 1st Division, North Africa
42-43: General Officer Commanding II Corps, North Africa
43     : General Officer Commander in Chief Central Defense Command
43     : General Officer Commanding 2nd Army

In North Africa, the US II Corps under Maj. Gen. Lloyd Fredendall was supported by XII Air Support Command (ASC). The II Corps leaders clung tenaciously to the provisions of FM 31-35, which allowed ground force commanders to use airpower as they pleased.

As a result of the misuse of airpower, there was no sustained effort by tactical air units to gain air superiority over the battlefield and no coordinated campaign by fighters, tactical bombers, and strategic bombers for that purpose. The US XII ASC, instructed to support US II Corps and the French XIX Corps, saw use of its aircraft determined by the II Corps senior commanders alone. Small formations of fighters assigned to fly daylight patrols over US troops were easy prey to Axis air forces, which held largely undisputed superiority in Tunisian airspace. Aircraft attempting to provide close support in the face of enemy air superiority met similar fates. Losses of aircraft and crews grew prohibitively high. By February 1, 1943, the 33d Fighter Group, the most experienced USAAF unit, had to be withdrawn to Morocco for regrouping.

Under such a fragmented theater organization, no broad "theater view" existed. On one occasion, the II Corps commander refused a French XIX Corps request for air support, claiming that it was not his responsibility. There was little coordinated planning between II Corps/XII ASC and British First Army/RAF 242 Group. These US and British air forces not only failed to gain air superiority, but also failed to provide adequate close support.

Following the disastrous defeat at Kasserine Pass, General Patton took command of the II Corps from Major General Lloyd Fredendall in March 1943, earning promotion to lieutenant general the following month.  Fredendall was blamed for over 3,000 casualties, 3,700 captured and 200 tanks lost.